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International Order and Empire
A New World Order. By Anne-Marie Slaughter. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2004. Pp. 341. Price: $29.95 (Hardcover). Reviewed
by D. Matthew Baugh.
International relations theory has not had a major shake-up for nearly
thirty years. At the end of the 1970s, a pair of landmark books-Theory of
International Politics by Kenneth Waltz and Power and Interdependence by
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye-radically redefined the field, articulating
two theories of world politics that have set the terms of debate for a
generation: neorealism and neoliberalism. A New World Order, which
reworks the assumptions of neoliberalism for the twenty-first century, now
promises to reshape the field yet again.
At issue is whether, and in what form, cooperation is possible in the
international realm. Anne-Marie Slaughter, a Keohane prot~g6 and the current
Dean of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at
Princeton University, agrees with neoliberals that networks of
interdependence are the key to international cooperation. But she does not
consider the most significant networks to be the traditional intergovernmental
institutions identified by Keohane and Nye, such as the United Nations or
NATO. Rather, Slaughter focuses upon the increasing linkages among
officials in every branch of government and their counterparts in other states.
In contrast to traditional state-to-state negotiation at the highest level,
transgovernmental networks put relevant officials from different countries in
direct contact with one another in order to resolve issues of common concern.
Other scholars have challenged the assumption that states operate as
unitary actors in the international realm, but none so thoroughly and
persuasively as Slaughter. This book makes a clear contribution to scholars
just in the sheer volume of evidence it provides of how twenty-first-century
officials deal directly and regularly with one another across borders. Far more
controversial and less convincing is the way in which Slaughter equates so-
called "horizontal networks" between officials of different governments with
,'vertical networks" between officials of national governments and
supranational institutions (p. 13). In eliding these two concepts, Slaughter
makes it clear that her project is normative. Underlying her conflation of
horizontal and vertical interaction is a radical new conception of sovereignty
that many will no doubt find objectionable, but which represents a significant
contribution to international relations theory.
There is no question, at least, that horizontal networks are becoming
increasingly important in international relations, and Slaughter aims to
demonstrate their proliferation "in every place we have eyes to see" (p. 11).
Links between executive branch officials, she acknowledges, are not a new
phenomenon. The day-to-day business of foreign policy has long required that
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diplomats and policymakers cooperate with their counterparts in other states.
But these days, "the scope and substance of that business has expanded; the
range and intensity of transgovemmental ties have increased and in many
cases become institutionalized; [and] the advantages of transgovernmentalism
have become more prominent while the disadvantages of many more formal
international institutions have become clearer" (p. 44). Officials from every
administrative agency and department of the modem regulatory state-
finance, health, drug enforcement, environmental protection, agriculture-
collaborate across borders.
Indeed, this horizontal process is becoming increasingly formalized, as
many inchoate transgovernmental networks have emerged into standing
organizations with budgets, staff, and regular meetings. This evolution is
particularly striking in the financial regulatory sector, with such bodies as the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the International Organization of
Securities Commissioners, and the International Association of Insurance
Supervisors overseeing crucial sectors of the financial services economy.
Most networks, though, are less formal and exist within the broader context of
established international organizations, executive agreements, or spontaneous
contacts between national administrative agencies. Some simply provide a
channel for information exchange, while others enhance law enforcement
through capacity-building. The most powerful, but also most rare, serve to
harmonize regulatory standards across countries.
Perhaps more surprising to some readers, and certainly more novel, are
the networks of judges and legislators that Slaughter documents. She notes
that members of the U.S. Supreme Court regularly meet their peers from the
European Court of Justice and have visited the highest courts of the United
Kingdom, Germany, France, India, and Mexico. Members of the U.S.
Congress not only conduct regular junkets to other parliamentary bodies but
also have established a formal partnership with the Russian Duma to "help
address key bilateral issues" (p. 114). These kinds of judicial and legislative
associations are even more common among the European countries, Canada,
and South Africa.
Moreover, while legislative networks have largely remained
consultative, many judges have begun to concretize their interactions through
the mutual recognition of foreign judgments. As Slaughter puts it, these
judicial officials are "constructing a global legal system" (p. 65). The
constitutional courts of Canada and South Africa, for example, regularly cite
precedent from other countries. But in the United States, the effort to look to
foreign cases, even as merely persuasive, non-binding authority, has ignited
fierce debate. Justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg have both
cited foreign judicial views in recent opinions-and have elicited fierce
rebuke from both their colleagues on the Court and outside critics.
Even more hotly contested in the United States, but increasingly
supported elsewhere in the world, are the new supranational courts. Slaughter
properly distinguishes the "horizontal" relationships between national courts
from the "vertical" relationships between national and supranational courts.
But she confuses the issue by labeling both as "networks" of judges. The
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distinctive feature of supranational organizations is that they hold some
measure of power over the state, whereas every other network she describes
exists among representatives of (at least nominally) equal sovereigns.
Slaughter resolves this seeming contradiction in the second half of A
New World Order, but only by supporting a novel, "disaggregated" approach
to sovereignty. She interprets the proliferation of cross-border networks as
evidence that the unitary state is breaking up into its component functions.
Sovereignty, she reasons, must follow the same path. "If the principal moving
parts of [world] order are the agencies, institutions, and the officials within
them who are collectively responsible for the legislative, executive, and
judicial functions of government, then they must be able to exercise
legislative, executive, and judicial sovereignty" (p. 268).
From this perspective, it is entirely possible to equate horizontal and
vertical relationships of power; in each functional domain, the officials meet
as fellow sovereigns. But this idea will no doubt strike many U.S. readers as
deeply troubling. As evidenced by U.S. objections to the International
Criminal Court (ICC) and often-voiced U.S. sensitivities to the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, a world order based on
supranationalism garners little public support in the United States.
The progressive integration of postwar Europe, by contrast, most nearly
approximates the supranational ideal, and Slaughter makes it clear that she
believes "[t]he model for [disaggregated] world order in many ways is the
European Union" (p. 134). This assertion is significant for two reasons. First,
the father of neoliberalism, Robert Keohane, recently expressed the same
sentiment in a widely discussed article in the Journal of Common Market
Studies. If this convergence between two of the field's premier scholars is any
indication, therefore, A New World Order may become the authoritative
treatise for a new generation of neoliberalism. Second, Slaughter's argument
points to the coming conflict between the United States and Europe over the
key institutions of world order. The United States has already clashed with its
European allies over one such institution, the ICC. If Slaughter is right about
the ascendance of the European model in the wider world, more such conflict
is on the way.
America's Inadvertent Empire. By William E. Odom & Robert Dujarric. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. Pp. xii, 285. Price: $30.00
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Mihailis E. Diamantis.
"The line of applicants now seeking membership in the American
empire is long" (p. 40), William E. Odom and Robert Dujarric write in
America's Inadvertent Empire, as they offer gratuitously optimistic
impressions of the international response to United States power. The authors,
a retired U.S. Army General and Hudson Institute Fellow, and a Visiting
Scholar at the Research Institute of Economy Trade and Industry in Tokyo,
respectively, have put together a well-researched though not overly academic
book, which speaks well of U.S. international involvement yet remains
somewhat thin with respect to the less glorious aspects of its hegemony. By
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the "empire" (the supposed "inadvertence" of which receives far less attention
than its hegemony), Odom and Dujarric mean those loose economic, military,
or cultural associations, primarily composed of Western and Pacific Rim
countries, which today control all the manifestations of modem power. That
empire is attributed possessively to the United States as its architect and
ultimate source of power.
The opening chapters of the book are the most engaging. Using
generalized terms and arguments that gesture toward lines of reasoning that
would each require an entire chapter for satisfactory explication, Odom and
Dujarric sweepingly identify the prominent sources of U.S. power. The
analytical core of their argument focuses upon internal diffusion of power-
both political and economic-among many hands in an effort to lower the
costs involved in acts of commercial and governmental exchange, what the
authors refer to as transaction costs. Liberal institutions secured by successful
"constitutional breakthroughs" (p. 41) are the hallmarks of such diffusion;
they guarantee individual liberties against those elites, monarchs, and tycoons
who would otherwise monopolize the state's resources.
Among such institutions, those underpinning market capitalism and free
enterprise are the most important, according to Odom and Dujarric. Indeed,
the authors assert that "[p]rivate property clearly must enjoy first place among
the individual liberties" (p. 15) in America's empire. Private ownership of
property is the sine qua non of a functioning capitalistic economy of
competing individuals; moreover, only U.S.-style capitalism can manage the
ever-increasing pace and number of exchanges in a modernizing economy by
diffusing those transactions across innumerable actors. A more centralized
economy, such as that of the former Soviet Union, is soon overburdened by
the unnecessary transaction costs that arise when all exchanges must first pass
through a single governmental entity. In the United States, the most liberal of
the liberal democracies, this diffusion substantially reduces the private and
public costs of doing business and accounts for the country's supreme
economic advantages-the ultimate basis of its power.
These considerations further explain the global dominance of the U.S.
empire and suggest why so many countries are, as the authors see it,
clamoring to join. The empire is unique in world history: "unipolar, based on
ideology rather than territorial control, voluntary in membership, and
economically advantageous to all countries within it" (p. 36). To ensure that
trade flows freely, the members (or subjects) of the empire must themselves
be mature liberal regimes, characterized by market economies with low
transaction costs.
Further, though, for trade between nations in the empire to function
efficiently, Odom and Dujarric argue that the empire itself must be modeled
after an efficiently functioning nation-state. Liberal ideologies must be
enforced on an international scale in order to protect property rights and, with
them, decentralized competition and trade. Within a single state, a constitution
and legitimate government can enforce liberal property principles. Similarly,
an international association of nations requires a third-party enforcer. Herein
lies the role of the United States in its empire. Enforcement of liberal
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principles requires corresponding military might, which the United States
obligingly provides and controls as an international public good. The authors'
admiring view of this imperial role becomes clear when they offer an
apocalyptic scenario of the disastrous consequences that would ensue if the
United States ever ceased to perform its enforcement role.
Though the United States is limited by no constitution in its exercise of
imperial power (indeed, Washington has rejected attempts to bind U.S.
freedom of action under international law), its liberal ideologies, the moral
character of its leaders, and its own long-term interest in assuring a freely
functioning international market constrain it nonetheless. The authors call this
dynamic a "quasi-constitutionalism based on self-restraint"-a phenomenon
that, in this reviewer's opinion, is not entirely reassuring. Why would the
United States reject legitimate international fetters to its own power, while
encouraging others to comply, if not to permit future illegitimate incursions
into the rights of other nations? A brief glance at the sordid recent history of
covert (and sometimes not so covert) abuses of foreign sovereignty by the
United States in South America and the Middle East should unsettle even the
staunchest of patriots. Yet Odom and Dujarric seem little troubled by such
events.
Following the exposition of the theoretical framework, Odom and
Dujarric move on to (overly) detailed accounts of the gaps between the United
States and its subjects-and between America's empire and those parts of the
world that have not yet joined it-in terms of military power, demography,
economic performance, university education, scientific research and
knowledge, and media and mass culture. Each topic occupies its own chapter,
and each chapter follows the same basic structure: establish the dominance of
the United States (or its empire) and set up a contrast with the feeble
contenders to U.S. power (or the power of its empire); consider how the
United States (or its empire) has come to its position of supremacy; make
policy suggestions for retaining that supremacy; and suggest how the rest of
the world benefits from U.S. hegemony. Though these chapters constitute the
bulk of the book, readers not particularly invested in a given topic may find
some pages mildly tedious. All will find some of the material in these chapters
unnecessary or tangential as the authors delve into the intricacies of the
Japanese university system or discuss antagonisms between the U.S. Navy and
Air Force. Few would deny U.S. hegemony in the areas that these chapters
discuss or need the bulk of a book to convince them that the United States will
likely retain its dominance for at least a few decades.
The authors' most provocative conclusion, fully articulated only in the
final pages of their book but alluded to throughout, is also that which most
touches upon current events: "the most serious danger to the American empire
[is that] the power of its leaders is limited primarily by their ideology-that is,
by the liberal norms that guide their use of that power. No other means exists
of checking them" (p. 207). Citing worrying recent commitments to U.S.
unilateralism (particularly President George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq, and
the resultant tensions between the United States and many of its allies), Odom
and Dujarric note that presidential and legislative decisions in the United
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States may undermine the empire. If not careful with how they wield
America's usually benevolent hand, the nation's leaders may rouse the
resentment of its closest allies. Such hard feelings can have no place in a
voluntary empire. Poignantly calling up many Americans' deep fears of the
terrorism President Bush allegedly sought to combat in Iraq, Odom and
Dujarric assert that "[t]errorists have never destroyed a Liberal regime, but
acts of parliaments have ended a few" (p. 86). Yet despite these solemn
warnings, the authors afford disappointingly little analysis to an account of
international antipathy, both past and present, toward the United States from
causes as varied as increasing international economic disparities, abhorrence
of U.S. social values, or mounting international pride in the face of U.S.
might.
Finally, sobering warnings and recommendations for policy changes
cannot keep Odom and Dujarric from the natural conclusion of their work:
"The durability of the American empire cannot ultimately be predicted, but
the resources and other advantages at U.S. disposal and the unique character
of this international regime provide an encouraging prospect that it will be
long lasting" (p. 218). The longevity of America's inadvertent empire is
unquestionable; that such endurance is encouraging remains doubtful.
From '9-11' to the 'Iraq War 2003': International Law in an Age of
Complexity. By Dominic McGoldrick. Oxford, U.K., and Portland, OR:
Hart Publishing, 2004. Pp. 380. Price $36.00 (Paperback). Reviewed by
Benjamin Paul Clinger.
Part survey, part analysis, Dominic McGoldrick's From '9-11' to the
'Iraq War 2003' attempts to facilitate discussion of the contemporary function
of international law. From the collective antiterrorism efforts of the world
community post-9/1 1, to Washington's sudden willingness to subordinate the
capture of Osama bin Laden to the removal of Saddam Hussein, McGoldrick
chronicles the major international political events of the past three years. As
Professor of Public and International Law at Liverpool Law School,
McGoldrick is particularly interested in the institutional and international
legal context within which the United States and United Kingdom marched to
war. At the same time, however, he warns of the danger of writing about
crises while in their midst-and his book suffers from several analytical
shortcomings, perhaps the inevitable result of attempting to contextualize
events before history has been able to take its course.
Considering McGoldrick's approach, it is difficult to discern for whom
he is writing. Many of the events and documents he details-especially the
extended treatment of the U.N. Security Council resolutions prior to the Iraq
invasion and the domestic political fallout over Prime Minister Tony Blair's
Iraq policy (e.g., the Hutton Report on the government's prewar intelligence
and the "sexed-up dossier" investigation)--have already been widely
discussed and debated in the newspapers and among academics. If
McGoldrick's goal is simply to round up what he deems to be the relevant
facts, he has done an adequate job. If, on the other hand, he wishes to
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contextualize and evaluate these developments, he has left this reader
disappointed.
Finding the occasional bit of insight in this volume requires work on the
part of the reader. McGoldrick's discussion of President George W. Bush's
rationale for regime change is a ready example. Having originally predicated
the invasion on Saddam Hussein's alleged weapons of mass destruction, the
Bush administration began improvising when no weapons were found.
Besides insinuating that Iraq had ties to Al Qaeda (and in their more brazen
moments, the 9/11 attacks), U.S. officials spoke of the moral necessity of
intervening in what was a brutally oppressive autocracy. Though such
sentiment was completely absent ex ante, to have conservatives (neo- or
otherwise) justifying the war ex post as a human rights intervention could
bolster support for future humanitarian intervention in places such as Sudan.
Depending on how Iraq turns out, however, this precedent could just as likely
shut the door to humanitarian intervention for a least a generation. Such
thinking goes to an analytical model that McGoldrick introduces early:
complexity theory. This model essentially argues that small causes can have
large effects, and it urges scholars to identify these "tipping points" (p. 8).
Unfortunately, McGoldrick applies the theory sparingly; so much so, we are
left to wonder why it was introduced in the first place. Is it just a fancy way of
asking if 9/11 changed everything?
The legal and moral issues McGoldrick identifies do make for
compelling reading. But his demarcation of two visions of world order is
cumbersome if not simplistic. Moreover, the essential philosophical
differences between what he sees as the competing ideologies could have
received more substantive analysis. McGoldrick insists that a "tenable" legal
case (p. 66) existed for the Iraq invasion, endorsing a complex argument the
British put forward which relies on Security Council Resolutions 678, 687,
and 1441. Construed collectively, these declarations purportedly gave the
coalition the authority to use force without an additional U.N. resolution
(although even the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations openly admitted
such a need, just moments after signing Resolution 1441). After failing to
convince the other Security Council members of this claim, Washington and
London then argued that Resolution 1441 independently sanctioned the use of
force. Despite his agreement with their reading of international law,
McGoldrick warns that normalizing such auto-interpretation would be
counterproductive. It would essentially turn international law on its head, as
every country-including, for example, Iran and North Korea-would then
have the right to interpret Security Council edicts to their liking. If this
outcome is the logical result, what makes the legal argument tenable?
In addition to its questionable reliance on a purported Security Council
mandate for war, the United States made an even more dangerous case for
preventative intervention by invoking the self-defense provision found in
Article 51 of the Geneva Conventions. In so doing, it effectively expanded the
definition of "imminent threat" to include potential future threats. Though one
gets a sense that McGoldrick sides with New York Times columnist Thomas
Friedman in his optimism that a democratic Iraq will change the dynamics of
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the Middle East for the better, he does admit that a preventative war doctrine
is almost certain to lead to conflict escalation and instability. Furthermore, he
emphasizes that most countries (with the major exceptions of Japan, Australia,
and Israel) have not accepted the Bush administration's expansive self-
defense rationalization.
Given McGoldrick's stated goals, it is striking how quick he is to
disparage French and German resistance to the use of force in Iraq.
Considering that supermajorities in both democracies were vehemently
opposed to the war, is McGoldrick suggesting that French President Jacques
Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder should have ignored the
political will of their people? If so, he would be wise to remember that many
rotating Security Council member countries were, despite intense diplomatic
and economic pressure, prepared to vote "no" on Iraq. Perhaps "Old Europe"
considered the potential consequences of endorsing an arguably illegal war
and determined that the costs outweighed the benefits? In light of the chaos
since the Iraq occupation, is McGoldrick so sure these dissenters were wrong?
In reasoning that the United States is better off with international law than
without it, McGoldrick is certainly practical; but he excuses too quickly the
Bush administration's contempt for the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty, the
Kyoto Protocol, and the International Criminal Court. What is more, his
contention that the Bush doctrine places long-overdue responsibility on
complacent nations lacks measure and is perhaps the most generous reading of
Bush's "you're with us or against us" position.
There are moments when McGoldrick seems to lose his focus and
digress from his stated aims. It is unclear whether he accepts Bush's claim that
the Iraq war is indeed a continuation of the war on terror. At one point he
asserts that one of the terrorists' objectives is the destruction of the modem
Western order. Not all experts would agree. The most recent book by CIA
counterterrorism expert Michael Scheuer (publishing under the pen name
Anonymous), Imperial Hubris, identifies six tangible political goals that have
been consistently articulated by the Al Qaeda organization-none of which
includes changing the way Western states manage their affairs internally or
destroying the abstract concept of freedom. Though not examined by
McGoldrick, the point is critical. Misunderstanding the enemy's endgame
may result in misunderstanding the utility of international law and multilateral
institutions. Speaking with a neoconservative voice, McGoldrick also parrots
the possibilities of creating a liberal society in Iraq. But he never stops to
consider that there may be significant differences between grass-roots
democratic revolutions and democracy imposed vi et armis. Likewise, his
assessment of the trend in the Middle East as a whole since the invasion of




Arguing About War. By Michael Walzer. New Haven: Yale University Press,
2004. Pp. xv, 208. Price: $25.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by Aryeh
Weinstein.
Arguing about War is an original and illuminating work, written so
lucidly as to engage anyone with a general interest in the conduct of war. In
this collection of essays, Michael Walzer, Professor at the School of Social
Science at the Institute for Advanced Study, accomplishes a feat rarely seen in
philosophy-he presents theoretical claims and then makes clear their
compelling practical significance. Walzer excels both in identifying
interesting theoretical questions about the justice of war and in showing how
his conclusions yield tangible policy recommendations. Nevertheless, the
answers he provides to some of these questions are ultimately unsatisfying.
Walzer's insightfulness into both theory and policy is exemplified in his
discussion of the justice of postwar occupation. One of Walzer's central
insights is that traditional just war theory-as articulated in part in his own
1977 landmark work, Just and Unjust Wars-is insufficient because it focuses
on the origins and the conduct of war. Given the seemingly increasing
tendency toward wars aimed at regime change, philosophers need also to
develop a theory on the justice of occupation after the fighting ends. Walzer
takes up this task, identifying three critical features of a just occupation: it
must instill confidence that the old regime will not return, it must allocate
power to the locals, and it must distribute the benefits of peace widely.
Walzer rightly seizes on the last two ideas to criticize the United States
for the cronyism and lack of transparency with which it has allocated Iraq
reconstruction contracts to a limited number of almost entirely American
firms. He further criticizes the lack of oversight of these companies' activities,
noting that U.S. corporations will be unlikely simply to cede to Iraqis the
power and monetary benefit involved in reconstruction of their own free will.
Here, while echoing some of the complaints issued by the European
nations that opposed the Iraq invasion, Walzer also takes the European Union
to task for its failure to ameliorate the situation. If Europeans were willing to
share some of the cost of reconstruction, they could assure greater oversight
and, thereby, justice, in the reconstruction effort. These countries, Walzer
writes, want power with no payout; they prefer to criticize U.S. injustices
costlessly, rather than to provide funding that would allow them to insinuate
themselves into the process and thereby make it more just.
In discussing another timely concern, the propriety of humanitarian
intervention, Walzer is particularly adept at giving his theoretical claims
practical relevance. Nevertheless, his theory here is ultimately less than
convincing. In an essay entitled "The Politics of Rescue," Walzer argues for a
general presumption against intervention "even when the process of self-
determination is something less than peaceful and democratic" (pp. 68-69).
Only where "cruelty and suffering are extreme" and a government is taking
"actions that . . . 'shock the conscience' of humankind" would he favor
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forcible intervention (p. 69). Walzer then crisply applies these principles, in a
subsequent piece "Inspectors Yes, War No," written before the recent Iraq
war. He argues that while "[t]he Baghdad regime is brutally repressive and
morally repugnant ... it is not engaged in mass murder or ethnic cleansing"
(p. 149). The latter acts, it seems, would be necessary for Walzer to
countenance humanitarian intervention. On the eve of the Iraq invasion,
Walzer did not think the regime was bad enough to warrant a war for
humanitarian reasons.
Unfortunately, the brevity of the articles results in insufficient argument
to supplement Walzer's theoretical claims for restraint in humanitarian
intervention. One might agree with Walzer that intervention is justified only
where actions that "'shock the conscience' of humankind" are at stake, but at
the same time conclude that the presence of a "brutally oppressive and
morally repugnant" regime makes such actions only a matter of time. It would
be perverse to wait for a dictator to shock the world's conscience before
acting, especially if other states can see a tyrannical government headed in the
direction of such atrocities. In some circumstances, intervening in advance in
order to prevent such atrocities will be preferable to waiting for an explicit
and horrific invitation to intervene.
The uncertainty involved in preemptive actions will always, however,
cast doubt on such interventions. Ultimately, one would need to balance the
possibility of wrongfully oppressing a foreign nation through war against the
potential devastation and oppression that would result from inaction.
Tensions arise among Walzer's different theoretical claims when he
considers whether merely discussing the justice of war has the effect of
making acts committed in wartime seem more justified. Critics of Walzer's
work have claimed that discussing the conditions under which war might be
just could potentially make horrible wars seem like good, or at least
acceptable, activities. Walzer deftly responds to this attack by noting that just
war theory does not endorse war-in a sense, war is always bad. Rather, when
one calls a war "just," that is merely to say that it is justified, that it is the
proper course of action given the circumstances. Nevertheless, giving the label
of justice to a war might have the psychological impact of making it easier to
engage in such a war, or to lay to the side the horrors that war imposes.
A concern with just this sort of psychological impact is central to
Walzer's treatment of a related question. Would it ever be acceptable to
engage in unjust war practices, such as deliberately attacking innocent
civilians? In addressing this question, Walzer aims to reconcile two opposing
intuitions. On the one hand, the rights of innocent civilians are inviolate. On
the other hand, in certain very extreme situations-"supreme emergencies" (p.
33) that put society's deepest values and continued existence at stake-a
utilitarian calculus would suggest that these rights may be violated. Walzer
criticizes such a rationalization as inviting overly hasty claims of a supreme
emergency, or leading decision-makers increasingly to devalue the lives of
others in weighing the costs of intervention against the dangers of inaction.
If Walzer is correct to note the psychological callousness that would be
engendered by employing a utilitarian calculus for supreme emergency, it
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seems he is also too quick to dismiss the ways in which any theory of just war
can make it easier to convince oneself that a certain act of aggression is
justified. Inasmuch as Walzer subscribes to his aforementioned defense of just
war theory-that the theory only evaluates when, all things considered, it
makes sense to proceed with a war-Walzer should grant the other side a
similar response. Violations of the rights of innocents are awful, a utilitarian
might note. These rights must weigh extremely heavily in a utilitarian calculus
and they must be overridden only in the most dire of circumstances. The fact
that a given society might choose to override them would not be, however, an
indication that it does not take them seriously. On the contrary, the supreme
importance accorded to the rights of innocents would only be underscored by
the extremely limited circumstances in which society would be willing to
violate them. For such a utilitarian, upholding the rights of innocents could
remain, to use Walzer's own words, "(almost) the whole of our duty" (p. 50,
emphasis added).
A reader of Arguing About War can expect to confront a variety of
provocative questions about the justice of war and a clear sense of their
significance for policy. That variety, however, sometimes brings with it a
series of theoretical claims that are less than fully convincing.
The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror. By Michael Ignatieff.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004. Pp. 160. Price $22.95
(Hardcover). Reviewed by Kelly Sarabyn.
The title of Michael Ignatieff's latest book, The Lesser Evil,
foreshadows its central claim: both security and liberty are of vital importance
to liberal democracies, and when nations must sacrifice liberty for security or
security for liberty, they at best choose a lesser evil over a greater evil.
Though it may be disputed, this position is not novel. Philosophers from
theological, deontological, and moral intuitionist traditions have argued that
morality may permit or even require the sacrifice of one fundamental value for
another. It is the first fault of the book, though not the last, that it does not pay
homage to these previous theories.
Ignatieff, Director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at
Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, presents his position as a
synthesis of two competing viewpoints. He believes he has achieved a
compromise between civil libertarians, who refuse to violate individual rights
for security purposes, and utilitarians, who allow for as many rights violations
as necessary to promote overall welfare. In fact, however, his account is much
closer to the former than to the latter. Ignatieff claims that any infringement of
an individual's liberty constitutes an evil, and his theory would be better
described as a modification of civil libertarianism than as a compromise
between the two positions.
Ignatieff misplaces his theory on another level. He believes that liberal
democrats are committed to his main ethical claim-that any infringement of
an individual's liberty constitutes an evil. Some liberal democrats no doubt
hold such a view, but many believe only in a rebuttable presumption that a
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deprivation of individual liberty is unjustified. When a justification is
available, however, there is no moral remainder. Proportionate punishment of
wrongful acts, for instance, arguably involves justified infringement of
individual liberty, but it is not thought on all sides to be the lesser of two evils.
For many liberals, justified punishment is not evil at all.
Ignatieff's commitment to the inviolability of individual liberty
determines the shape of his prescriptions for the war on terror. Though he
purports to balance the interests of security and liberty, security earns little
concession-further evidence of the thin gap between his position and civil
libertarianism. He argues for an absolute ban on psychological and physical
torture, the assassination of political leaders, and detention without due
process. Unsurprisingly, Ignatieff does not consider the guilt of the individual
in question when constructing these absolute bans. The lesser evils that may
be justified, depending on the severity of the circumstances, are narrow in
scope: depriving potential terrorists of light and sleep, instituting national
identification cards, and more closely monitoring scientific research related to
weapons of mass destruction.
The Lesser Evil relies mostly on the hope that readers will agree
intuitively with the sanctity of individual liberty. In addition, Ignatieff argues
that violating liberties to save a democratic liberal nation is almost always
self-defeating. Once a nation engages in such acts, that nation is not worth
saving: it becomes inhuman and monstrous. The general point is true enough,
and Ignatieff details with skill and insight the psychological mechanisms that
would cause the degeneration of liberal democracy.
This general point does not, however, justify Ignatieff s asymmetric
balancing. To take one example, it does not warrant his blanket ban on torture.
Rather, it supports a policy of general restraint, of stopping oneself before one
has gone too far. Liberty can concede more to security than Ignatieff
supposes.
Overall, The Lesser Evil lacks detailed or novel information, and its
pithy analysis of major conflicts leaves the reader unsatisfied. This volume
will be welcomed by those who already agree with Ignatieff's commitment to
the sanctity of individual liberty. Ignatieff's discussion of the psychology of
terror and of terrorists is informative, but those who do not accept his
fundamental moral premise will find the rest of Ignatieff's analysis simplistic
and unpersuasive.
Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for
International Law. By Allen Buchanan. New York: Oxford University
Press, 2004. Pp. vii, 507. Price: $35.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by
Stephen M. Ruckman.
International law has so far operated without a coherent framework
when addressing matters of global moral concern. There is certainly no
shortage of international law bearing moral content-the European
Convention on Human Rights, the International Labor Organization's
Tripartite Consultation (International Labor Standards) Convention, and many
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other international agreements have moral commitments at their core. Nor is
there a lack of theorizing about peoples' and nations' moral obligations at the
international level-Thomas Pogge's cosmopolitan vision for the world's
poor and David Held's call for "cosmopolitan democracy" are but two
prominent examples. The problem for international law is thus not the paucity
of its moral foundations but their infirmity.
Allen Buchanan, Professor of Public Policy and Philosophy at Duke
University, is no stranger to this confused state of affairs. In Justice,
Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, he offers an account that is as much a
tireless demolition of international law's extant moral foundations as it is a
systematic construction of his own. Buchanan rejects the prevailing view that
the goal of international law should be peace for all, pursued with unwavering
deference to national interest and standing law. Instead, Buchanan posits that
the chief aim of international law should be justice for all, and that the pursuit
of such justice may rightfully require acting against national interest, breaking
the peace, and even breaking the law.
Buchanan's argument rests on what he terms the "Moral Equality
Principle"-the cosmopolitan notion that, from a moral standpoint, "all
persons are entitled to equal respect and concern" (p. 87). From this principle
arises each individual's limited moral obligation to take actions that will
protect moral equality, an obligation that generates both the negative duty not
to treat others unjustly and the positive duty to support institutions that
guarantee against such unjust treatment. This "Natural Duty of Justice" exists
"to help ensure that every person has access to institutions that protect his or
her human rights" (p. 427).
Wrapped up in this reasoning is the claim that justice mandates the
protection of basic human rights. Equal respect and concern for all individuals
require, at a minimum, guaranteeing certain fundamental rights: life; security
of the person; resources for subsistence; equality before the law; freedom of
expression and association; and freedom from persecution and systematic
discrimination on grounds of ethnicity, race, gender, religion, or sexual
preference. Justice demands a system of international law that legally
obligates international organizations to intervene when these rights are
threatened. Furthermore, since any institutional framework will concentrate
enforcement power, Buchanan astutely recognizes an institutional obligation
to protect the human rights of all people as equally as possible. Buchanan
argues persuasively that democratic governance offers the best hope for
ensuring this robust protection of human rights, and so should be the form of
governance used whenever feasible.
From these moral foundations, many implications follow-both for what
can be considered legitimate international law (and legitimate legal action),
and for what legal rights people can invoke under the banner of international
law if their human rights are not being protected. These remedial claims
include the rights to secession and to some form of intrastate autonomy where
past inequalities have been perpetrated at the state level.
Of course, however logical, Buchanan's set of basic and implied rights
plainly fails to command universal assent. While this discord poses no
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problem for the soundness of Buchanan's account-which cannot be
determined by the breadth of its acceptance-it does pose major barriers to its
enforcement. Since current enforcement of international law deriving from the
U.N. Charter is consensus-based, any lack of consensus on human rights will
lead to inadequate enforcement of those rights. Buchanan anticipates this
problem, and urges a controversial solution: the creation of a "treaty-based,
rule-governed, liberal-democratic regime for armed intervention that bypasses
the UN Charter-based requirement of Security Council authorization" (p.
440). Insofar as its efforts to protect human rights would contravene existing
Charter-based law, this coalition would be illegal-but Buchanan sees no
problem with such illegality. "If illegal acts are necessary to bring about
important substantive improvements in the system whose rules for legal
change are serious impediments to progress . . . then [the] presumption in
favor of change through legal means can be overridden" (p. 465).
As may already be apparent, the success of Buchanan's moral
framework requires the demise of many long-standing moral theories,
including those based on consent, national interest and the unified state,
tolerance, legal absolutism, and of course realism, according to which
international law can never adequately institutionalize morality. Much of
Buchanan's book is devoted to taking up and critiquing these incompatible
theories in turn, and the reader will have to judge his success on these fronts.
Whatever one thinks about his criticisms of other approaches, however, one
comes away impressed with the consistency of Buchanan's position, despite
the panoply of possible counterclaims.
Buchanan's work greatly advances the moral project of international law
both by defanging those moral theories that have hampered international legal
theory and by providing an account that-in its very creation of a moral
obligation to seek international justice (rather than mere moral permission to
do so)-finally gives international law moral bite. Yet his work does not go
quite far enough, failing to spell out how international actors should fulfill
their moral obligations, and in what order. How, for example, ought a state
with limited resources determine whether its duty to protect a right of
individuals within its borders trumps its corresponding obligation to those
people outside its borders? How, too, ought his proposed treaty-based
coalition-the real teeth of his argument--determine when armed intervention
is necessary, and what form it should take (via Somalia-style peacekeeping?
Kosovo-style air assaults?)? At the moment, the United States does not
recognize the right not to be executed-a codified right in the European
Union-nor does it recognize certain rights of children as articulated in the
U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child. Would Buchanan suggest that
these human rights discords call for "coercive diplomacy" or even armed
intervention (p. 442)? If so, who would be obliged to intervene against whom?
In the case of the rights of the child, for example, the United States may think
itself obliged to intervene to protect children's rights above and beyond those
espoused in the U.N. Convention.
This area of uncertainty represents a shortcoming of Buchanan's
argument, but not a refutation of it. While this criticism points out a portion of
Recent Publications
the argument that needs further exploration, it does not diminish the
impressive coherence of that argument. At the end of the day, Buchanan does
not presume that his account provides a fully fleshed-out moral edifice for
international law. It provides, as the book's title suggests, a set of foundations.
In this endeavor, it succeeds ably where others have not. Buchanan
demonstrates that, while the moral project of international law may not
command firm agreement, it can at least rest upon firm ground.
Understanding Globalization
Why Globalization Works. By Martin Wolf. New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2004. Pp. xviii, 398. Price: $30.00 (Hardcover). Reviewed by
David E. Pozen.
Is it possible to profess a profound love for multinational corporations,
capital markets, and free trade and at the same time care deeply about the
plight of the poor in developing countries? In Why Globalization Works,
Martin Wolf turns this question on its head-if one sincerely hopes to
improve life for the world's most disadvantaged, Wolf insists, it is impossible
not to embrace corporations, markets, trade, and the globalization they entail.
A former World Bank economist, Wolf has long advocated a market-based
approach to development in his Financial Times column. Why Globalization
Works seeks to cement the desirability of this approach and thereby restore
reason to the debate on globalization.
Reviewing both the current literature on globalization and the centuries-
old literature on capitalism and trade, Wolf sets forth a comprehensive case
for economic globalization-defined as "the integration of economic
activities, across borders, through markets" (p. 14)-as the sine qua non of
mutual growth and prosperity. The first half of the book sweeps through the
history and macroeconomics of international markets in order to contextualize
the modem critiques of globalization, which Wolf then tackles one by one in
the book's second half. Throughout, Wolf combines the economic liberalism
and commonsense tone of The Economist with the passion for globalization
and epigrammatic style of fellow columnist Thomas Friedman. (Though
Wolf's signal attempt at a Friedmanesque catch phrase-labeling today's
dissenters "antiglobalization.com" (p. 4)-falls utterly flat; Wolf never
explains the Internet analogy and drops the term after the first chapter.) The
result is a deceptively simple treatise with an inescapable conclusion: "The
problem today is not that there is too much globalization, but that there is far
too little" (p. xvii).
Specifically, there is too little implementation in the developing world of
the so-called "Washington Consensus," a set of market-friendly reforms
emphasizing privatization, trade and finance liberalization, fiscal and
monetary stability, and corporate deregulation. These policies-promoted
since the 1980s by the U.S. Treasury, the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
and the World Trade Organization (WTO)-have generated enormous
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resentment from critics who believe they enrich developed-world companies
at the expense of developing-world citizens, strip governments of the power to
engineer their economies, and fuel a global race to the bottom in welfare
provision and labor standards. The protest literature soon led to street protests,
culminating in the mass demonstrations that scuttled the 1999 WTO meeting
in Seattle.
To Wolf, all this outrage seems at best misplaced and at worst extremely
dangerous, because the evidence from the last two decades supports the
Washington Consensus. Global inequality and poverty have been decreasing;
multinational corporations operating in developing countries have treated and
paid their workers better than have domestic firms and brought manifold
ancillary benefits; export-oriented economies have consistently outperformed
those more inwardly oriented; welfare states have continued to expand; and
the IMf and WTO, though at times inept, have played a key role in mitigating
the damage of numerous national crises. Seattle-style protesters, in their
righteous myopia, threaten to turn back all this progress and rob the
developing world of the international trade, capital, and technology-the
globalization-that it desperately needs.
Wolf also reserves some venom for Western governments that,
hypocritically, maintain high trade barriers on agriculture and textiles in
deference to domestic producer lobbies. One World Bank study estimated
annual welfare losses to developing countries due to agricultural subsidies at
$20 billion, almost 40 percent of all development aid. Similarly unjust are
American and Canadian efforts to protect drug patents abroad, but not at
home, and the "brain drain" of skilled workers from low-income to high-
income countries.
From these critiques, Wolf arrives at his central proposal-global
governance on issues ranging from the environment to the Internet, poverty,
disease, trade, investment, and security. As a classical small-government
liberal, Wolf professes a fondness for international organizations that is
perhaps the most surprising element of the book. (A close second is his
support for certain infant-industry protections in developing countries,
although here Wolf can cite compelling success stories in post-World War II
East Asia.) Yet in his view, supporting international organizations is perfectly
consistent with classical liberalism: the transnational externalities associated
with these issues demand an international response, and governments' policies
will be more predictable and transparent (and limited) when they are bound to
international agreements. Whereas for Wolf "the assumption of a benevolent
welfare-maximizing [national] government is naive and implausible" (p. 275),
the assumption of benevolent and welfare-maximizing global institutions
appears eminently sound. The "democratic deficit" occasioned by
international agreements does not trouble Wolf, nor does their tendency to
reinforce existing power dynamics.
While Wolf is certainly correct to identify the enormous potential, even
necessity, of global institutions across a wide range of policy areas, he
understates the likely difficulties in establishing and coordinating such
institutions. Efforts to expand supranational authority have consistently
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produced a backlash among affected populations, making Wolf's vision of
exponentially increasing its scope seem hopelessly far-fetched. Moreover,
international institutions present unique problems of structure and
management that often limit their effectiveness; consider the Organization of
African Unity, the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program, or, according to some skeptics,
the United Nations itself. Wolf acknowledges the risk that international
institutions will privilege hierarchy and order above initiative and flexibility,
but he declines to pursue this idea to its logical conclusion: a world shot
through with international institutions might stifle the entrepreneurship and
market-based solutions that he so cherishes. When Wolf calls at the book's
end for rich countries to increase their foreign aid dramatically-a
recommendation oddly out of sync with his earlier characterization of such aid
as distortionary, corrupting, and ineffective-it seems an act of desperation,
an implicit concession that global governance is a long way off.
Why Globalization Works suffers from other, lesser faults than the
flimsiness of its conclusion-most notably in what it excludes. Wolf discusses
only institutional actors and, notwithstanding his affinity for the private sector,
overlooks nongovernmental mechanisms for alleviating poverty. He also
conspicuously ignores Russia's and South America's largely disastrous
experiences with Washington Consensus reforms. Finally, Wolf lumps
together all the models of liberal democratic capitalism (LDC), slighting a
whole academic sub-industry that aims to classify these models according to
their welfare state typologies. While Wolf is surely right that, compared to
socialist or communist regimes, such models are much more similar than
dissimilar (and all vastly superior), their differences remain significant,
especially in the context of a globalization debate so focused on the role of the
state. Wolf's failure to parse the different conceptions of LDC reflects a larger
failure of the book: he devotes so much energy to defending LDC against neo-
Marxist, socialist, and obscurantist critiques that one almost forgets that most
contemporary critics of globalization are none of these. Nevertheless, an
intelligent defense of LDC is always useful, and Wolf valuably debunks the
radical critics of globalization, whose apocalyptic tracts have too often
defined the debate. Passages eviscerating Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri,
Naomi Klein, and George Monbiot are some of the most enjoyable in the
book.
For all its warts, Why Globalization Works succeeds mightily at its core
objective-persuading readers that economic globalization, though not
without its difficulties, demands their loyalty. Wolf opines, rather
patronizingly, that anti-globalization protesters "fall . . . in the category of
spoiled children. But they are 'our' children. If we fail to persuade the
idealistic young of the merits of a liberal global economic order, it may
founder before the certainties of its enemies" (p. 10). It has happened before;
economic globalization, by some measures, reached its all-time zenith in
1914, when World War I and its aftershocks triggered a downward spiral of
protectionism. It took another world war for the West to get back on track.
Linked to politics, globalization is inherently precarious. Wolf reminds
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readers how much vigilance it takes to preserve globalization, and suggests
just how much creativity will be required to improve it.
Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights.
By Susan K. Sell. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp.
xv, 218. Price: $60.00 (Hardcover), $21.99 (Paperback). Reviewed by
Mark Wu.
How do multinational corporations shape U.S. trade policy? Why do
they sometimes succeed tremendously, and at other times get only a fraction
of what they want? In Private Power, Public Law, Susan Sell examines the
role that large U.S. multinationals play in shaping the international rules
governing intellectual property (IP).
Sell, Associate Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at
George Washington University, uses a political science framework to explain
"who gets what, when, and why" in global IP. To set up her analysis, she lays
out a theory of structured agency, noting the interplay between structure,
institutions, and agents. The relative dominance of each component vis-a-vis
the others depends on the problem at hand and the time period in question.
Sell uses the negotiations on the 1994 Agreement for Trade-Related
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), one of the accords emerging from the
Uruguay Round that established the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
its aftermath to illustrate this theory. Her book is at its best when recounting
the historical narrative behind TRIPS. She shows how structural forces in the
1970s and 1980s-including increased global trade, growing U.S. trade
deficits, and a rethinking of U.S. antitrust policies-were already leading
lawmakers in Washington to reconceptualize IP rights, but argues that IP
ultimately leapt to the forefront of the nation's trade agenda in the Uruguay
Round thanks to the devoted effort of twelve chief executive officers from
major U.S. multinationals. These business luminaries did not share identical
interests; some were concerned with copyright standards while others cared
mainly about patent rights. Nevertheless, they recognized the power of their
collective strength and formed an ad hoc IF committee to advise U.S.
policymakers during the trade talks. This committee essentially synthesized
and reframed the intellectual framework for arcane matters in IP and trade-
culminating in the largely pro-IP provisions of TRIPS.
Sell's narrative provides a detailed account of the lobbying, political
maneuverings, and diplomatic horse-trading behind the formation of TRIPS.
Even those familiar with the story will likely discover a new insight or two,
particularly in her anecdotes culled from interviews with the individuals
involved.
Engaging as this narrative is, however, readers should keep in mind the
larger questions that it raises. Is it true, as Sell argues, that "in effect, twelve
corporations made public law for the world" (p. 96)? If so, could this feat
happen again, and what does it imply about the legitimacy and transparency of
the global trade regime? Sell argues that the confluence of four factors
allowed corporate agents to shape Washington's trade agenda in IP:
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multinationals mobilized effectively; U.S. policymakers and businesses were
able to develop a common position; other developed countries managed to
resolve their differences; and developing countries failed to mount a sustained
opposition. In this case, agents played a critical role. However, in different
circumstances, similarly skilled corporate agents may be less successful. Sell
demonstrates this point by showing how a different mix of these four factors
led to substantially different, and less pro-business, outcomes in the Uruguay
Round negotiations on services (excluding financial services) and investment.
Sell also devotes a chapter of her book to examining what has happened
in the years since TRIPS came into effect. She notes how the environment has
changed: the unity of the disparate pro-IP industries has eroded while an
active opposition to the accord, centered particularly on efforts to liberalize
access to medicines in the world's poorest countries, has emerged. Sell argues
that the global trade regime is in the midst of a second cycle of structural
elaboration of international IP rules. While the first cycle was shaped by
private corporations, the current one is being shaped by a contest between
TRIPS' architects and its protesters. The latter, in particular, have become
better-organized and more sophisticated as agents, and as a result they are
reshaping the public discourse on global intellectual property rules. Sell
illustrates her point by taking the reader through a number of recent IP-related
trade controversies.
Again, the anecdotes are interesting, especially Sell's account of how
public health activists disrupted campaign events for Vice President Al Gore
in the 2000 U.S. presidential elections in order to precipitate a change in
President Bill Clinton's policies. However, the major shortcoming of the book
is that Sell fails to push her theoretical framework further when analyzing
post-TRIPS developments. Readers looking for a framework to understand
who gets what, when, and why in post-TRIPS global IP rules will likely be
disappointed.
In addition, Sell fails to incorporate a multi-level analysis into her
theoretical framework to the same extent that she ably incorporates the
temporal dimension. Yet this dimension is critical if one is to understand the
workings of global IP trade negotiations. In defining international IP rules,
discussions occur on three levels. First, lobbyists and activists work to
persuade different government agencies of the merits of their position.
Second, government agencies negotiate with each other to reach a consensus
position. Finally, the ultimate decisions are made by states through bilateral or
multilateral negotiations in various international fora. Failure to achieve a
desired outcome can result from insurmountable barriers raised at any of these
levels.
Without this multidimensional analysis, Sell's book falls short in
providing readers with answers--or even means to consider-some of the
more interesting questions in the global IP debate. For example, one of the
major post-TRIPS controversies concerns implementation of regulatory
requirements for the protection of confidential data. TRIPS Article 39
contains notoriously ambiguous language and remains the source of
contentious debate between U.S. and European trade negotiators, on the one
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hand, and activists and developing country negotiators on the other. Why was
this ambiguity enacted into WTO law? Did corporate agents fail to frame the
debate as effectively as they had on other issues---creating a first-level
problem that reverberated upward? Or were compromises during third-level
negotiations to blame? If the latter, why were developing countries able to
weaken the IP liberalization forces in Article 39, but not in other areas?
Similarly, readers are left wondering why activists have enjoyed only
limited success in their efforts to increase flexibility for developing countries
under TRIPS. Is it because activists have not been able to frame the discourse
in a fully convincing way during first-level talks with U.S. governmental
agencies? Or should the public's focus shift to the inter-agency and
congressional battles within Washington, to renewed policy debates on
compulsory licensing and pharmaceutical pricing? Or maybe the problem is
really the inability of developing countries to hold their ground on IP in
bilateral and multilateral talks when faced with offers of attractive concessions
on agriculture, textiles, and other matters. How do failures on all three levels
affect and reinforce each other?
Finally, Sell's book presents a thorough discussion of corporate and
nongovernmental agents, but makes little mention of the role of institutional
agents. Institutional players, which may seem to lack agent representatives
during first-level talks, can evolve to become agents themselves in the second-
and third-level negotiations. The question is, do they actually do so? In other
words, how much do the individual government negotiators matter?
These questions are not meant to distract from Sell's valiant efforts to
provide a political science framework to analyze the evolution of global IP
norms. Sell's book is a good first step in a much-needed endeavor and will be
a valuable resource for those new to the debate. But the questions do highlight
how much further political science needs to push before it can provide a
satisfactory explanation for "who gets what, when, and why" when it comes to
distributing IP rights globally between corporations and the public at large.
Human Rights on the World Stage
The Human Right to Water: Legal and Policy Dimensions. By Salman M.A.
Salman & Siobhdn Mclnerney-Lankford. Washington, D.C.: The World
Bank, 2004. Pp. v, 180. Price: $30.00 (Paperback). Reviewed by Galit
A. Sarfaty.
In The Human Right to Water: Legal and Policy Dimensions, Salman
Salman and Siobhin Mclnerney-Lankford make a powerful case for the
existence of a human right to water within the legal framework of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).
Salman and Mclnerney-Lankford, who serve as Lead Counsel and Counsel,
respectively, in the Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development
and International Law Practice Group of the World Bank Legal Vice
Presidency, are recognized experts in the fields of water law and human rights
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law. Their argument begins by noting that lack of water and unclean water are
the leading causes of premature death worldwide. An important step in
alleviating these dismal conditions is recognizing that water is a human right.
Recognition of a right to water would, for one thing, exert pressure on states
to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of that right, and would provide
incentives for states to adopt necessary measures both to achieve the full
realization of the right to water and to prevent third parties such as
corporations from interfering with it. While some issue areas in their study
might have benefited from more detailed elaboration, the authors convincingly
establish the interconnection between development, water, and human rights.
Although they acknowledge the absence of any legally binding authority
for the human right to water, Salman and McInerney-Lankford conclude that
an incipient right is emerging in public international law. In providing a
comprehensive justification for the recognition of this human right, the
authors suggest that there are various sources from which to recognize human
rights aside from legally binding instruments. The path towards recognition of
a right as customary international law begins with soft law commitments
(such as resolutions and declarations) and then leads to the adoption of
domestic legislation and internalization of the human rights norm into
domestic legal systems. The right to water can be inferred from Article 25 of
the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, which grants every human the
right to a standard of living adequate to the health and well-being of himself
or herself and his or her family.
Of particular importance is General Comment No. 15 on The Right to
Water, which was adopted by the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in late 2002. According to the authors, the General Comment
carries significant legal weight not because it creates a new right under the
ICESCR, but because it infers the right to water from established rights-the
right to an adequate standard of living in Article 11, and the right to the
highest attainable standards of physical and mental health in Article 12. In
addition, the right to water is central to the recognition of other ICESCR
rights, thus highlighting the interdependence and indivisibility of all human
rights.
The General Comment declares that non-state actors might possess
obligations to cooperate with states towards the protection of the right to
water. International organizations, including U.N. agencies and international
financial institutions, should take steps to ensure that their policies take this
right into account. Yet Salman and Mclnerney-Lankford only give passing
reference to this issue. Given the authors' professional positions at the World
Bank, they might have contributed more of an analysis of the Bank's
international responsibility to protect the human right to water.
On a different note, as the authors acknowledge, General Comment No.
15 does not mention the duties and obligations of the users of water, such as
the duty to conserve or pay for water. The Comment is exclusively addressed
to states party to ICESCR, and one wonders whether individuals should bear
some of the burden of managing water resources. Other international
instruments, such as the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable
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Development (1992) and the World Bank Water Resources Management
Policy Paper (1993), emphasize a more participatory approach to water
management that involves users, planners, and policymakers. While the
authors briefly discuss participation in water management, the mechanisms by
which participation can be most meaningful and effective deserve fuller
treatment given their significance in operationalizing the human right to
water.
The private sector is another potential actor in the management of water
resources. The authors provide a few brief case studies where privatization of
water services led to a considerable cost increase for users. For example, the
privatization of water services in Cochabamba, Bolivia and the resulting
increase in tariffs led to widespread civil unrest. Further elaboration on these
case studies would have provided insight into the difficulty of weighing
affordability with private sector participation.
The economic value of water is highly relevant when making policy
decisions over water resource management and private sector investment. A
related issue is whether water should be given free of charge or whether this
would lead to environmentally damaging uses of the resource. In regard to the
affordability of water, General Comment No. 15 advocates "appropriate low-
cost techniques" and "appropriate policies such as free or low cost water."
Among the important questions raised by the authors is whether water should
be viewed as an economic commodity as well as a social good and a human
need.
The authors emphasize that implementation of the human right to water
requires considerable financial resources. This raises additional obstacles for
poor and developing countries, which often have insufficient resources to
fully ensure the protection of all human rights. Salman and Mclnerney-
Lankford duly respond to this concern by indicating that this right, like other
economic, social, and cultural rights, must be progressively achieved using the
maximum of a state's available resources. As they accurately note, the goal of
progressive realization stands in contrast to that of civil and political rights,
which require an immediate obligation to ensure that these rights are
respected.
This book makes a valuable contribution to development studies and
international human rights law by raising several important consequences that
follow from the right to water. Once water is viewed as a legal entitlement
rather than a need or a commodity, the achievement of improved levels of
access will be accelerated. Communities and vulnerable groups will be
empowered to take part in decision-making processes. In addition,
acknowledging a human right to water will help focus attention on the
resolution of conflicts over the use of shared watercourses. Finally, as the
authors astutely demonstrate, recognition of the right to water would further
the adoption of a rights-based approach to development, which sees
individuals at the center of development rather than as passive recipients of
aid.
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The Impact of European Rights on National Legal Cultures. By Miriam Aziz.
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2004. Pp. xiii, 206. Price: $70 (Hardcover).
Reviewed by Robert A. Wiygul.
On October 29, 2004, leaders of the various European Union (EU)
countries gathered to sign the European Constitution. The document still
awaits ratification by EU member states, several of which have promised to
submit it to the test of a national referendum. Still, the drafting of a
constitutional treaty was an important step forward in the continuing
integration of Europe, not least in light of the increasing friction the process
has encountered in the last few years. Some of the public resistance may be
ascribed to contingent historical circumstances: some countries may chafe at
fiscal restraints imposed on them in a time of slow economic growth coupled
with an increasingly burdened welfare apparatus. But some of the backlash
seems intrinsic to the integration enterprise itself. The European ambition is to
knit together a large number of states with diverse economies, cultures, and
histories in a political, legal, and economic union that will realize the benefits
of pooled resources while respecting the individual identities of all its
members.
It is this tension between the pluribus and the unum that Miriam Aziz,
Research Fellow at the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the
European University Institute, addresses in her first book. As Aziz rightly
reminds the reader, the EU may have been forged by international
agreements--declarations, conventions, and treaties-but it is a supranational
entity ostensibly superordinate to its constituent states. Nonetheless, the EU
relies heavily on member states to implement its policies and directives,
particularly in the area of rights protection, which is the focus of Aziz's book.
In her view, the "[i]mplentation of European rights incurs an ongoing
reconfiguration of the Member States' legal cultures, thereby challenging their
sovereignty and, by implication, their identity" (p. 7). Aziz argues that, despite
the extensive reconfiguration that has already occurred, legal scholars
continue to use an anachronistic, state-oriented analytical framework when
trying to conceptualize rights in the new Europe. Thus, for example, political
rights in the EU are often described in terms of citizenship, even though "the
actors engaged in political participation in the EU include, de facto, EU
citizens and non-EU citizens . . . [and] the forms of participation are more
innovative than classical conceptions of representative democracy allow for"
(p. 8). Aziz's chief goal is to fashion a new analytical framework adequate to
the task of understanding the dialectical relationship between the EU and
national law. Ultimately, however, her book's value lies more in articulating
the problem than in specifying a solution.
Aziz employs case studies to examine instances in which national law
and EU-mandated rights have collided, and she displays a thorough
knowledge of recent developments, especially in Germany. In assessing the
success of Aziz's project, it is useful to start by mentioning what her book
does not include. Unfortunately, it is marred by poor editing and ponderous-
if not ungrammatical-prose. From a more substantive standpoint, Aziz
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assumes a familiarity with the institutions, international agreements, and
important debates in the history of Europeanization. Her failure to provide this
history is unfortunate, not only because it would help orient the reader but
because it would provide essential context to understanding the controversies
and case law that Aziz examines. For a book focused on the relationship
between rights and national sovereignty, this study, strikingly, includes no real
philosophical or historical investigation of either concept. Rights, for Aziz,
exist insofar as they are explicitly or implicitly granted by law. Sovereignty
refers to a state's ability to decide for itself its policies and how it will treat
those within its borders. There is, of course, nothing particularly objectionable
about dealing with the concepts in this way, but Aziz misses the chance to
look at what role the historical and philosophical underpinnings of rights and
sovereignty might play in the interaction she analyzes.
In addition, although the book claims not to be concerned with "whether
all residents of the Union ought to benefit from rights" (p. 7), Aziz is
obviously sympathetic to the new rights regime and is often critical of
assertions of national sovereignty. Aziz often implies that sovereignty must
give way in order for Europeanization to be realized, without acknowledging
the argument raised by other scholars, such as Alan Milward (who is included
in Aziz's bibliography), that European integration after World War II was in
fact necessary to save the nation-state. Clearly, there is more to say about the
effect of "Europe" on national sovereignty.
Aziz does offer some tantalizing historical morsels. In emphasizing
alternatives to the nation-state model, she refers to both Roman law and the
medieval city-state. The former demonstrates that a legally unified Europe is
not a wholly new invention; the Romans showed that "law or legal reasoning
[could be] . . . an application of legal principles instead of being territorially
based within a context constituted by customary law" (pp. 39-40). Similarly,
Aziz invokes the medieval city-state as an alternative to the "Fortress Europe"
model of rights, which classifies individuals as either EU or non-EU citizens.
Just as those within the walls of the medieval city-state had important
relationships with settlements beyond their confines, non-EU nationals, such
as the Turkish guest workers in Germany, play an essential role in the EU and
should not be denied political rights on the basis of an inappropriate
citizenship model.
These analogies succeed in undermining the sense of historical necessity
attached to the nation-state, but they occupy only a few pages and are
underdeveloped. In this respect, they are indicative of a shortcoming of the
book as a whole: it makes starts in several different directions, but ultimately
just scratches at the surface. To take another example, Aziz suggests that,
because of their experience under communism, the newer EU members may
guard their sovereignty more zealously than their western counterparts.
Certainly this is a contention worth pursuing, but it receives little additional
comment.
In the end, Aziz is much clearer in diagnosis than in prescription. That a
new analytical framework is needed to understand rights and legal cultures in
the context of European integration is apparent. How to construct such a
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framework is a good deal more elusive. Aziz effectively argues that the focus
must shift from law to legal culture, and that "[w]e should recognize ... the
modesty of what Europe's constitutional moment can deliver." (p. 169). In her
view, "[c]onstitutional rights may . . . in effect be rhetorical and are not
always capable of transforming power structures" (p. 170). The book's
proposals for how to effect that transformation, however, seem rather facile.
Aziz's major practical suggestion is that elites should be required to take a
loyalty oath to the European Constitution as well as their own country, and her
chief theoretical proposal is for a "comprehensive multi-disciplinary approach
[that] would allow jurists to map, classify and monitor the respective
constitutional orders and cultures, modes of governance, the relevant elites,
and any transformative dimensions in response to European rights" (p. 172).
These steps will not in themselves move very far to the goal, but Aziz's book
helps put scholars on the right track to understanding the evolving legal
culture of European integration.
Islamic Jurisprudence
Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence. By Muhammad B'qir al-Sadr. Translated
with an introduction by Roy Parviz Mottahedeh. Oxford: Oneworld
Publications, 2003. Pp. 208. Price: $60 (Hardcover). Reviewed by
Intisar A. Rabb.
Lawyers and academics alike regard Islamic law with questions of
practical and scholarly interest. If there is a continuing place for Islamic law in
the modem world, what is the process of legal derivation and what modes
dictate continuity or contemplate the possibility of change? Roy Mottahedeh,
Professor of Islamic History at Harvard, provides an introduction to and
translation of Lessons in Islamic Jurisprudence by the late Muhammad Baqir
as-Sadr that makes it easier for English speakers to pursue such questions.
An influential twentieth-century Islamic scholar and jurist, Sadr hailed
from a family of leading Iraqi ShT'T clerics. He quickly became prominent in
Iraqi intellectual and religious circles through his scholarship, with books such
as Lessons joining or replacing centuries-old texts of the seminary's core
curriculum. He was also active politically, and co-founded a major Iraqi Shi'i
political party in 1950. Feeling threatened, Saddam Hussein executed Sadr in
1980. Ironically, Sadr's nephew, Muqtada as-$adr, has completed no religious
or legal training, yet has capitalized upon the Sadr family renown to gain a
platform for his radical policies in Iraq.
Though other English expositions and paraphrases of Islamic legal texts
precede this volume, none examines a complete work of Shi'T jurisprudence.
With Lessons, Mottahedeh now presents an account of Sh'I jurisprudence,
renders Islamic jurisprudential thought intelligible for both the lawyer and the
non-specialist, and provides a key to understanding pre-modern Islamic
jurisprudential literature through a lucid modem work.
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The book is divided into three principal sections. First, Mottahedeh
provides an introduction that places Sadr's work in the broader framework of
Islamic legal development. Next follows the translation of Sadr's work itself.
Finally, Mottahedeh offers the reader a number of useful tools: a summary of
Sadr's text (with commentary), a glossary, a list of Arabic terms mentioned in
the glossary, and an index.
Mottahedeh introduces Islamic law and jurisprudence by focusing on
four core fields: the nature of Islamic law, its historical development, the
nature of Islamic jurisprudence, and medieval Western and Islamic law.
Throughout the Introduction, Mottahedeh highlights distinctions
between Islamic and Western legal philosophy. He explains how Muslim
jurists aspired to a combined moral and legal system that attempted to classify
and develop rules concerning all human acts. Subsets of only two of those
categories-forbidden and mandatory--could be litigated in Islamic courts;
these also happen to be the only categories that Western lawyers would label
"law" proper.
Mottahedeh's brief overview of Islamic law's composition includes both
Sunni and ShT'T developments. He traces, for instance, how the initial carte
blanche enjoyed by the first four caliphs to promulgate public and personal
status laws gradually shrank to cover only matters of public and
administrative law. The decline in their lawmaking authority stemmed in part
from the impact of the "pious opposition," composed first of proto-Shi'is, then
of Sunni jurists who had also become suspicious of the government.
Mottahedeh further notes how this opposition birthed the enduring split
between legal and government institutions in the Islamic system.
Mottahedeh also discusses considerations that are gaining currency in
some modem studies of the field. For instance, the evolution of geographical
differences into interpretive differences for Mottahedeh reflects a "pre-Islamic
underlay" that many Muslims have "downplayed . . . unnecessarily" (p. 9).
Although it is well-known that Islamic law jurists classically allowed a place
for custom (it had legal consideration as long as it did not conflict with
existing law), Mottahedeh argues that in developing that law, jurists did not
always say when they were adopting existing custom or relying on local
presuppositions to guide their rational interpretations of the law. In other
words, they ignored the impact of culture (over and above custom) on the law.
The translation of $adr's work includes four sections. The first,
"Characterization of Jurisprudence," reviews the definition and history of the
development of Islamic jurisprudence and describes its place alongside the
related discipline of law. $adr notes that while the former deals with the
theory and methodology of law, and the latter with its practical application,
the two are related. "[E]xpansion of discussions of application impels
discussion of theory a step forward ... [because] it stirs up difficulties as it
advances and necessitates the establishment of general theories for their
solution" (p. 44).
The second section, "Substantiating Arguments," comprises the bulk of
the book, dealing with the two main sources of Islamic jurisprudence: the
Qur'an and the Sunna (prophetic practice for Sunnis, prophetic and "imamic"
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practice for ShT'Ts). In attempts to create a coherent method of legal derivation
from those sources, jurisprudential specialists must analyze texts that record
both verbal and non-verbal arguments based on divine law. Accordingly, $adr
devotes many pages to word origins, the lexical elements of texts, and the
signification(s) of words and forms of speech with legal relevance. Evident
here is a unique feature of Islamic legal jurisprudence and education: a focus
on text-based, formalistic legal hermeneutics that arise out of what Professor
Bernard Weiss has called Islamic law's "textualist/intentionalist bent."
Sadr follows his discussion of textual bases with a section on the rational
bases for interpretation: "Procedural Principles." These principles cover
situations in which jurists cannot define the law vis-A-vis the sources with
absolute certainty. Instead, jurists rely on the legal sources to provide a means
of arriving at a practical duty before the law by defining a default procedural
rule-of-thumb.
Finally, Sadr turns to the "Conflict of Arguments" in a last, short chapter
(which expands in volumes two and three).
With his translation of Lessons, Mottahedeh offers English speakers a
clear, sophisticated treatment of the core topics, definitions, categories and
problems in Islamic jurisprudence. While other works in translation interrupt
the text with complex Arabic terms (including Arif Abdul Hussain's
translation of this same work in 2003) and use reasonable though sometimes
inapt translations, Mottahedeh has provided a deliberate all-English rendering.
This complete transformation of the text may initially be off-putting to a
reader familiar with Arabic terminology but not with Mottahedeh's English
renderings. But this is one of the underlying points. The English reader should
become absorbed in a scheme of understanding Islamic jurisprudence for its
legal concepts and reasoning, rather than for philological exercises that focus
on foreign terms. A quick look at the glossary or index of Arabic-English
terms can overcome any confusion. Mottahedeh's useful notes that
accompany the summary help further explain conceptual usage.
Mottahedeh follows common translations for familiar terms such
consensus (Ymd ) or derivation (istinbat); where appropriate, he also offers
translations for concepts particular to Sh'i thought, such as exculpatoriness
(mu'adhdhiriyya), inculpatoriness (munajjiziyya) and procedural principles
(us.il 'amaliyya). He also proposes excellent ways to resolve unsettled
translations: argument (for dall); prima facie meaning (for zdhir or zuhar);
presumptive (for zannO; and, of course, law or legal understanding (forfiqh)
and jurisprudence (for usal al-fiqh). Some translations read awkwardly, such
as "probativity of assurance" (for hujjiyat al-qat) or "permittedness" (for
ibdha). There are some inconsistencies, as when Mottahedeh translates
istihsan in his Introduction as "favorable construction" (p. 14) and later as
"discretionary opinion" (pp. 50, 178)-in the latter case specifying the Sunni
context of the term. And there are some omissions, as when the glossary lists
some types of lawyers-the juristconsult (mujtahid) and the jurist (faqih)-
but not the jurisprudential specialist (usali) that appears frequently in Sadr's
text.
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However, these minor points do not detract from the enormous value of
this work. Mottahedeh has well met his aims to present Shl'T jurisprudence
and make Islamic jurisprudential thought more tractable for the English
reader. In typical form, Mottahedeh has managed to present the most
important aspects of a vast Islamic tradition in precise, readable form with a
helpful introduction that leaves the reader thirsting for more. One hopes that
Mottahedeh will follow this work with translations of Sadr's subsequent two
volumes, and that he will write his proposed companion book that will cover
Islamic legal history more thoroughly. In the meantime, with the increasing
interest in Islamic law in U.S. law schools, other universities, and among non-
specialists, here is a volume that can be put to wide use.
